



Citizen Ivanov versus Comrade Tito: Partisans in Soviet and Yugoslav 
Cinema of the Second Word War (1960-1985) 
To articulate what is past does not mean to recognize “how it really was.” It means to take 
control of a memory, as it flashes in a moment of danger. … The only writer of history with 
the gift of setting alight the sparks of hope in the past, is the one who is convinced of this: that 
not even the dead will be safe from the enemy, if he is victorious. And this enemy has not 
ceased to be victorious. 
 
Walter Benjamin, “Thesis on the Philosophy of History”1 
 
Written at the onset of WWII, Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History’ fit 
quite precisely the memorialization of a conflict that remains a cornerstone of European 
politics. As Benjamin would have predicted, the historicism of WWII adopted the victor’s 
narrative, and this narrative was shaped by the dialectic between barbarism and civilization, 
in Benjamin’s understanding of the interdependence of both concepts.2 Although well-suited 
to different times and places, Benjamin’s affirmation that “not even the dead will be safe 
from the enemy” is especially relevant to the memorialization of the conflict in Yugoslavia 
and in the Soviet Union. As is well known, the Stalinist version of The Great Patriotic War 
(1941-45) went so far as to censor the number of war victims, both during and after the war, 
stressing victory, (male) heroism and, perhaps unsurprisingly, the leadership of Comrade 
Stalin. The favouring of heroic victors was, however, questioned in the cultural arena, 
especially following Nikita Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization in the late 1950s. Around the same 
time, Yugoslavia developed a peculiar genre, Partizanski Films, which mythologised the 
unity of the country’s nations under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980). Although 
these films were partly designed as uncomplicated celebrations, this article will show how 
they reveal a perceived fragility in the country’s social fabric. Soviet and Yugoslav 
filmmakers, I will argue, used constellations or “montages” of the lives or, rather, the deaths 
of ordinary people in order to hasten or slow down the forces that led to the dissolution of 
both federations in the early 1990s. These partisans, in other words, opposed not only an alien 
enemy but also the less tangible “enemy within” of the time and place of the films’ 
production.   
The paradigmatic image of the World War II partisan is a French-based, beret-wearing young 
man who plants bombs on rail tracks. However, during the war, partisans were only 




Western Borderlands of the Soviet Union and in Eastern Mediterranean countries such as 
Yugoslavia.3 These combatants were mystified in the war’s aftermath, with Soviet partisans 
often shadowing the Red Army in popular memory. This memorialization was expressed in 
monuments, literature and, above all, in cinematic productions which became part of the 
foundational narrative of the Belarusian Soviet Republic, raised to the status of a Partisan 
Republic in the Soviet era. Likewise, in the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, the cult 
of partisans was consecrated as an idiosyncratic cinematic genre focused on them, Partizanski 
Films.4 This article will scrutinise the politics of the construction of these historical and 
cultural figures, using three films from each country whose legacy remains undisputed, 
namely, Andrei Tarkovsky’s Ivan’s Childhood (Ivanovo detstvo, 1962; also known as My 
Name is Ivan), Larisa Shepitko’s The Ascent (Voskhozhdeniye, 1977), Elem Klimov’s Come 
and See (Idi i smotri, 1985), Veljko Bulajić’s Battle of Neretva (Bitka na Neretvi, 1969), 
Hajrudin Krvavac’s Walter Defends Sarajevo (Valter brani Sarajevo, 1972) and Stipe Delić’s 
Battle of Sutjeska (Sujetska, 1973). 
In both the USSR and Yugoslavia, the cinematic productions that dealt with resistance 
against Nazi Germany provides platforms for notions of national narratives to be both 
represented and contested. In Yugoslavia, memories of partisans, and the films that mystified 
them, attest to the downfall of the inter-ethnic concord during Marshal Tito’s leadership 
(1945-80). The violent disintegration of the country in the 1990s reveals the delicate 
compromise on which this consensus was built, as seen by the films studied here. By contrast, 
the memorialization of the conflict in the USSR provides a window into processes that were 
contested the cultural Thaw that followed Khrushchev’s speech denouncing Stalin’s “cult of 
personality” in 1956.5 These are views, however, that remain cornerstones of communal 
identity in today’s Belarus and Russian Federation.  
Prominent Soviet filmmakers, such as Tarkovsky, Shepitko and Klimov, effectively 
challenged the official version of the war. They did so by foregrounding civilian victims, as 
well as the harrowing plight of Soviet Jews, which had been largely deleted through their 
integration within the Nazi “war of annihilation,” or Vernichtungskrieg, aimed at all the 
peoples of the USSR. The films that they directed present complex views of the situation, 
stressing collaboration and suffering, therefore undercutting the official notions of heroism 
and unity of the nation under the leadership of Stalin. Although made with estate finance and 
under the auspices of official production companies, such as Mosfilm or Belarusfilm, these 




they do not endorse, sometimes unambiguously, the Soviet defence against the German 
invasion. However, as this article will illustrate, they challenged explicitly the Stalinist use of 
the conflict as the country’s second “foundational narrative.” In other words, in spite of the 
existing censorship, these films did not subordinate themselves to the delivery of political 
messages. This applies as much to their content as to their genre, which rejects the aesthetic 
constraints of social realism or its postwar, “anti-fascist” heir, neo-realism.6 These are aspects 
that make these films unique historical sources for the investigation of social attitudes 
towards death and mourning, not always limited to the war.7 
During World War II, Soviet propaganda linked resistance to the Nazis to its foundational 
paradigm, the October Revolution of 1917. This can be seen in the visual campaign to 
“defend the motherland’ that produced a good number of posters, as well as some prominent 
films. Soviet war films connected the early 1940s to 1917, very much like Sergei Eisenstein’s 
Battleship Potemkin (Bronenosets Potemkin, 1925) had recast 1905 as the onset of the Soviet 
Revolution. These propaganda films foregrounded the roles, heroism and spontaneous 
leadership of ordinary civilians, becoming hagiographies of real or imagined resisters. This 
putative naturalness disappeared in productions made towards the end of the war, when Stalin 
began to rebuild his image as the country’s foremost hero. This “cult of Stalin” as father, as 
well as an astute military commander, is taken to its logical extreme in Mikheil Chiaureli’s 
The Fall of Berlin (Padeniye Berlina, 1950). In this celebratory film, the leader himself lands 
in the conquered capital to be rapturously welcomed by his soldiers and the prisoners that he 
liberates. Needless to say, Stalin never visited Berlin. Even more unlikely is Stalin’s role 
advising the film’s protagonist, Alexei Ivanov (Mikheil Gelovani), how to woo his paramour, 
Komsomol teacher Natasha (Marina Kovaliova), using poetry. The couple’s final reunion in 
Berlin, where she had been deported as a prisoner of war and he arrives with the Red Army, 
is blessed by the leader himself, acting as patriarch in every sense of the term. Fall of Berlin, 
however, offers one of the last examples of socialist realism, with cinematic representations 
changing substantially thereafter. 
The Soviet films looked at in this article deal with destruction, redemption, guilt and 
punishment during one of the most devastating conflicts in human history: the USSR’s Great 
Patriotic War (1941-45), and are mostly set in the Belorusskaya Sovetskaya 
Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic), known in the west 
as White Russia and to the Germans as Weißrussland. The religious and socio-political 




in the films. By contrast, the Yugoslav films that show the partisan struggle mourn overtly 
the country’s victims. Mostly released during the 1960s and 1970s, these films represent 
partisans fighting tirelessly against German Nazis, bumbling Italian fascists, Croatian Ustaša, 
and Serbian Četniks, the former classed as collaborationist villains.8 Clearly influenced by 
Hollywood’s Westerns, the films showcase the idiosyncratic Yugoslavian “third-way” that 
mirrors cinematically the country’s non-aligned political position after it split from the 
USSR’s Cominform in 1948.  
Widely popular in the countries that emerged from the former nation, Partisan Films are 
firmly grounded in the search for unity that dominated the war’s aftermath and which started 
to unravel soon after Tito’s death. In hindsight, these films allow us to explore the relevance 
(or lack of relevance) of a view of the past designed to support an extinct “imagined 
community,” in Benedict Anderson’s understanding of the concept.9 However, at the time in 
which they were released, these productions offered not only a memorialization tool or an 
atonement strategy. As will be seen in this article, they attempted to cement the social 
consensus on which Yugoslavia was rebuilt after the war at a time precisely when that 
consensus was challenged by the rise of ethnic-based nationalism. These films offer wistful 
foundational narratives representing a binary, Manichaean view of the Yugoslav struggle 
against the Axis forces and their local collaborators. By so doing, they overtly mystify the 
successful resistance led by Tito, which paid dearly for the liberation of the country with a 
massive cost in human lives and material losses. 10 In 1944, when the Red Army arrived in 
Belgrade, they were welcomed by partisans who had already expelled the Axis forces from 
most of the country. The films that project this victorious struggle cast as equals civilians 
from Yugoslavia’s different ethnicities, and include a good number of women.11  
From the 1950s and, especially, throughout the 1960s and 70s, Tito’s government contributed 
generously to a good number of productions and blockbusters, including many films about 
the war. It also sponsored the construction of a “cinematic city,” Avala Film, in the country’s 
capital, Belgrade. These lavish films spared no expense, offering generous contracts to well-
known actors, as well as providing large numbers of conscripts and armament. In the most 
famous case, an existing bridge over the river Neretva was blown up in the film of the same 
name. As seen in Mila Turajlic’s documentary Cinema Komunisto (2010), the actual bridge 
over the Neretva River, located in Republika Srpska’s Jablanica (Bosnia and Herzegovina’s), 
was blown up during the shooting of the film. This was designed to give the film an aura of 




Indeed, the site is today as famous for the film as for the battle itself and is now the preferred 
location for tourist photographs. Tito’s phrase, “Ranjenike ne smijeno ostaviti” (“Not without 
the wounded”) is inscribed on a stone in the garden of the museum commemorating the 
battle, unveiled by Tito when the museum opened, in the thirty-fifth anniversary of the battle, 
in 1978. As Michael R.D. Foot observes, Tito’s words were not a mystification of the actual 
treatment of the wounded, “experience, in the first offensive, showed them that wounded who 
were left behind were massacred; thereafter, wounded preferred to be killed by their own 
side, or carried away by it.”13  
The Yugoslav’s People’s Army (JNA), normally referred to as Tito’s Partisans, started to 
operate not when the country was occupied, on 6 April 1941, but after the invasion of the 
USSR, codenamed Operation Barbarossa (22 June 1941). Likewise, the USSR’s partisan 
movement also started at the same time and was, by and large, not a spontaneous uprising, as 
most units were led by military commanders, political commissars or both. Only one week 
after the country’s invasion, on 29 June, the Council of the People’s Commissars of the 
USSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued a directive to all sections of 
the party, state administration, trade unions and Komsomol (youth movement) to set up 
partisan detachments.14 By the end of 1941 there were around 2,000 partisan units with an 
estimated 90,000 people operating in them. Although, as Alexander Statiev has shown, these 
initial efforts were largely futile and chaotic, they became more effective from 1942, when 
they constituted reliable partisan units. From this time, partisans were organized by local 
authorities, party leaders or officers from the Red Army who had found themselves in the rear 
of the swift three-pronged advance of German forces towards Leningrad, Moscow and 
Stalingrad.15 Partisan detachments included many trusted party members or people who were 
personally known to the leaders, among whom were some efficient organisers, such as 
Panteleimon Ponomarenko.16  
Partisan activities in the USSR were thus controlled by the respective party committees of the 
republics whose territories were under the occupation and who vetoed membership. The 
primary objective of this guerrilla warfare was to support the Red Army by holding up as 
many Germans as possible in the rear. They did this mostly through disruption of road and 
rail communications, blowing up bridges, roads, telephone lines or warehouses. They also 
gathered intelligence, helped soldiers or prisoners escape and conducted propaganda and 
education campaigns, urging the population to resist or to support resisters. The movement 




One of these groups is the focus of one of the most important films to come out of the USSR, 
Tarkovsky’s Ivan’s Childhood, where the eponymous character, a twelve-year old scout, Ivan 
(Nikolái Burliáyev), loses his family, innocence and life. As the film’s title suggests, Ivan 
represents the lost infancy and innocence of Soviet children, idealised through Tarkovsky’s 
dream sequences. This remarkably moving story of vulnerability is constructed visually 
through murky black and white photography, which intensifies the mood created by the film 
(Figure 1). 
Tarkovsky’s Ivan’s Childhood is based on a short story written by Vladimir Bogomolov, 
which was simply entitled “Ivan” and was published in 1957, one year after Khrushchev’s 
speech. The director co-wrote the script with Mikhail Papava, introducing some changes to 
the plot, including the end. Ivan’s Childhood was Tarkovsky’s first feature film and made 
him well-known in cinematic circles when it was awarded the Golden Lion at the Venice 
Film Festival and the Golden Gate Award at the San Francisco International Film Festival on 
its release, in 1962. Tarkovsky went on to consecrate himself as a ground-breaking auteur, 
perhaps one the most famous to come out from the Soviet Union, from which he defected in 
1983, three years before his untimely death. Paradoxically, the success of Ivan’s Childhood 
did not endear Tarkovsky to some in the European left, who censored especially the 
“bourgeois’ style of his idyllic and symbolic dream sequences. Others, such as Jean-Paul 
Sartre, defended a genre variously labelled socialist surrealism, somewhere between 
expressionism and neo-realism, influenced by pioneer film-makers such as Dziga Vertov or 
Salvador Dalí.17 Sartre’s defence highlights both the film’s style and content, singling out the 
use of camera positions to heighten Ivan’s helplessness and provoke empathy. Tarkovsky 
himself referred to his style as “sculpting in time,’ offering a challenge to the logic of “linear 
sequentiality’ in cinema.18 As Dina Iordanova remarks, the director deployed this technique 
“in favor of heightening feeling through poetic connections.” Iordanova emphasises how 
these “poetic links” are “[reveal] cinema’s potential ‘as the most truthful and poetic of art 
forms.’”19 
Poetic is not a label that can easily be applied to the action-packed Yugoslav films about the 
war. As a fully-fledged genre, these films developed twenty years after the conflict, although 
there are some earlier examples, such as Vijekoslav Afrić’s Slavica (1947). These films were 
seen and celebrated by large segments of the Yugoslav population both in cinema and, 
subsequently, on television, and remain popular in the nations that arose from the former 




showcasing the time when what is now a twentieth-century historical concept existed as a 
“non-aligned” communist country beyond the Stalinist sphere of influence.20 The two most 
popular productions deal with the most celebrated battles of the war, Neretva and Sutjeska. 
The first, Bulajić’s Battle of Neretva, has the additional honour of being one of the most 
expensive motion pictures ever made in the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. The film’s 
budget, personally approved by Tito, is estimated to have been between $4.5 and $12 million 
and its stars included internationally-renowned actors, including Sergei Bondarchuk, Yul 
Brynner, Franco Nero and Orson Welles.21 These actors went to the country attracted by the 
sums of money paid to them and to endorse Yugoslavia’s position as a friendly communist 
outpost beyond the reach of the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact.  
Battle of Neretva recreates an Axis attack lasting from January until March 1943, codenamed 
Fall Weiss (Case White) by the Nazis and known in Yugoslavia as the Fourth Offensive.22 
Filming it took over sixteen months, substantially longer than the battle, and a combined 
battalion of 10,000 soldiers were deployed. This meant that two different sets of recruits from 
the JNA participated as extras. In addition, four villages and a fortress were especially 
constructed and subsequently destroyed, and many Soviet-made T-34 tanks that were 
camouflaged to look like German Tiger I tanks were thrown into the river.23 The film offers 
an example of “Yugoslavism,” simplifying what was a multi-layered conflict. This can be 
seen at the very beginning of the film, when a partisan greets people gathered around him as 
“brothers, Yugoslav nations, Serbs, Macedonians, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins and 
Muslims.” 
Battle of Neretva’s view of the war embodies the historical perspective that dominated 
Yugoslavia during Marshal Tito’s rule and foregrounds the partisan relationship with the land 
which is characteristic of the genre, and that can be appreciated in many long shots of the 
beautiful and rugged mountains and rivers in the country (Figure 2).24 People and the 
landscape they inhabit are thus “wounded’ by the destruction visited on them by the 
occupiers. As Dragan Batančev notes, “Bulajić managed to create the impression of drilling 
and “wounding” the land which partisans, as in some sort of a religious fascination, were not 
willing to surrender. This almost pantheistic relation of partisans towards the land is also 
visible in … the demolition of the bridge.”25 Ironically, however, the production of the film, 
which included blowing up the bridge, as well as a large number of vehicles, was just as 




A similar, quasi-pantheistic embedment of people and landscape informs Soviet films such as 
Ivan’s Childhood or Klimov’s Come and See. It also dominates Shepitko’s The Ascent, which 
charts the transformation of a Red Army partisan, Sotnikov (Boris Plotnikov), into an 
unlikely socialist martyr. Shepitko’s film is a breath-taking rendition of a novel written by 
Belarussian writer Vasily Bykov, Sotnikov, which was rendered into English as The Ordeal 
(1972). It was released in 1977, when it won several accolades.26 The action is set in Belarus 
in 1942 and is shot in black-and-white by cinematographer Vladimir Chuchnov, who died 
with Ukrainian-born director, Shepitko, in a car accident, in 1979. Chuchnov’s 
cinematography includes striking long shots of blizzards in a snowy landscape that leave a 
long-lasting imprint on the viewer. The immensity and solitude of the cold landscape is 
conveyed through the juxtaposition of these wide shots with mid-close-ups of people. The 
film opens with one such tracking shot of a group running away from Nazis in a scene that 
sets the mood for the remainder of the film (Figure 3).  
The main protagonists of The Ascent are two partisans whose destinies are linked but who 
make different choices when faced with adversity. Sotnikov is an improbable partisan hero, 
whose stature and self-belief gradually increase following his incarceration and torture. 
Although Sotnikov appears orthodox in both the Christian and Marxist-Leninist senses of the 
word, his characterization remains unusual on many counts. A teacher prior to the war, the 
slightly-built Sotnikov is an unlikely hero, who is not only asthmatic but is soon wounded in 
the leg, remaining ill and crippled for most of the film. However, Sotnikov gradually acquires 
a saintly aura that increases as he reaches his final hour in the quasi-Biblical ascent of the 
film’s title. Sotnikov’s partner, Rybak (Vladimir Gostyukhin), is initially presented as a 
courageous partisan who not only volunteers to fetch food for the civilian party that they are 
escorting but also returns to help the wounded Stonikov, dragging him through deep snow to 
reach safety.  
Sotnikov has been wounded after they take a sheep from an elderly headman, Pyotr (Sergey 
Yakovlev), whom they accuse of collaborating. As they try to return to their party, they are 
located by Germans and politsai, and Sotnikov stays behind to cover Rybak, leading to his 
wounding. At this point, Shepitko places the camera on the snow and tracks their slow slog, 
as Rybak tries to drag Sotnikov one inch at a time, effectively involving the audience in their 
struggle. Eventually, they reach a cabin where three children live and when their mother, 
Demchikha (Lyudmila Polyakova), returns, so do the Germans. Demchikha hides them in the 




alongside a distraught Demchikha, now a suspect of helping partisans. On reaching their cell, 
they are joined by a Jewish girl, Basya (Viktoriya Goldentul), who has survived the round 
ups and has been helped by a woman whose name she refuses to reveal. Also arrested is 
Pyotr, the headman, on account of not having denounced the theft of the sheep, which makes 
him guilty of supporting partisans. They are interrogated by another politsai, Portnov 
(Anatoly Solonitsyn), with Sotnikov undergoing torture for his refusal to reveal the 
whereabouts of his detachment, while Rybak hesitates and offers to collaborate, initially 
considering that he will be able to run away to fight another day. 
Following their last night together in a cell, the group is taken out to be executed, and 
Sotnikov addresses Portnov in an attempt to exonerate his colleagues, blaming himself for the 
actions in which the politsai had been killed. In the book on which the film is based, Sotnikov 
wishes to inculpate himself but Portnov ignores him. In the film, however, Shepitko adds a 
scene after Sotnikov calls Portnov, who is conspicuously standing outside of the circle 
formed by the Germans, and is framed from Sotnikov’s point of view. This is followed by a 
shot-reverse-shot that shows Sotnikov in a mid-close up as he slowly limps his way towards 
Portnov, who occupies the camera’s position. When Sotnikov defiantly faces up to Portnov, 
the lightening of his short hair creates a soft aura around his head, confirming his 
transformation into a martyr (Figure 4). His representation follows the tradition of religious 
paintings, in which shafts of light would enlighten those cast as saints, occupying the liminal 
space between the living and the divine. Sotnikov’s “passion” is couched as a Christology, 
and he accepts his fate with fervour.  
In the short speech that follows, and which encapsulating the film’s message, Sotnikov shows 
that he has found peace in his destiny after Portnov addresses him as a Russian everyman 
“Citizen Ivanov.” Sotnikov contests this, pausing intently before informing Portnov that he is: 
“Not Ivanov, Sotnikov,” born in 1917, the year of Russia’s October Revolution, and is a 
member of the communist party, as well as a lieutenant of the Red Army. He adds that he has 
a “father, a mother …,” and, following an emphatic pause, “… a motherland.” Sotnikov’s 
hiatus thus emphasises the word Родина (rodina or motherland), a concept famously 
immortalised in the posters of the time or the statue raised in 1967 in Kiev to commemorate 
the Battle of Stalingrad, “The Motherland Calls You” (Родина мать зовёт! Rodina-Mat' 
zovyot!). In these posters, the concept of rodina was deployed in order to widen popular 




Portnov, incisively portrayed by Anatoly Solonitsyn, listens with his head slightly bent 
sideways and his penetrative gaze fixed on Sotnikov. The last words make him lower his gaze 
slowly and turn away from Sotnikov. This temporary acknowledgement of his sense of loss is 
followed by his raised voice informing the Germans that Sotnikov’s words amount to 
“nothing,” sealing his dependence on them. Sotnikov, that is, is as much an emblem of his 
country as an ordinary human being in extraordinary circumstances who sacrifices his life for 
the “motherland,” Rodina, which is, then, in many ways the film’s main protagonist and a 
spiritual essence from which Portnov and Rybak will be forever alienated. In other words, 
Shepitko’s form of pantheism expresses some deep-seated religious sentiments which were 
obviously proscribed by Soviet communism, stressing the inner tragedies of those who, 
through force, selfishness or fear, alienated themselves from their motherland. Indeed, 
Rybak’s ultimate punishment will be his unassailable sense of guilt. Rybak’s inability to live 
(or die) with his actions, is reminiscent of Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment and 
he remains outside Shepitko’s parable of redemption.  
Death and mourning are central to the experience of the war that these films showcase. In 
many ways, films give a voice to the suffocated mourning that was often proscribed from the 
official narrative in communist countries, collating the tragedies of the twentieth-century in 
the anonymous deaths of “ordinary” people. This is nowhere better summarised than in the 
final scene of The Ascent, where the film’s title is made meaningful. In this scene, largely 
absent from the book, the five people about to be hung make their way up to the hill where a 
scaffold awaits them. Their ascent is choreographed with a non-diegetic trenchant score by 
composer Alfred Shnittke, as they make their way past civilians who have been ordered to 
watch the execution. Here, Sotnikov embraces death like a messiah among his apostles, while 
the camera pauses to give us a view of each of them. We are offered a microcosmic view of 
Soviet Belarus and, by implication, the occupied USSR, and the Russian “motherland.” 
Pyotr, the headman that they had robbed and who they had accused of being a traitor, appears 
dignified, accepting death with stoicism. The same attitude is shared by the Jewish girl, 
Basya, who looks over the horizon, striving to contain her childish fear. Next to her, 
Demchikha cries silently, lamenting the fate of her abandoned children. These people 
exemplify the attitude of many Soviet citizens, defined not so much by the Soviet hierarchy 
but by the attitude of an occupying army who classed as enemies: the untermensch. These 
four accept their fate, presenting a dignified image of courage to the local onlookers, whose 




audience (Figure 5). The last shots of the scene link the group with the silent watchers, as 
Sotnikov catches sight of a small boy wearing a budenovka who contemplates his execution 
with a mixture of admiration and sorrow, crying silently. Following a shot-reverse-shot that 
established a connection between the condemned and the onlooker, Sotnikov smiles to the 
boy before his final moment, offering a dim vision of future hope (Figure 6).  
The religious imagery and music in this scene stress the intricate relationship between 
partisans, ordinary people and the landscape. This relationship had been established in the 
opening scenes, when the group made their way through deep snow inch by inch. It is 
intensified when Rybak helps the wounded Sotnikov through the soft snow that covers their 
bodies and it culminates in the intercutting of shots between the condemned, the people and 
their environment. The Ascent showcases the telluric embedment of partisans and civilians 
with the wild and haunting landscape that harbours them. This is a relationship that Rybak 
loses indelibly, as demonstrated by the final shot-reverse-shot of his anguished face 
contemplating the environment from which he is now permanently alienated. The film closes 
with the image of his wounded self forever detached from a snowy landscape framed by a 
small church which he contemplates (Figures 7 and 8). 
Alienation is a concept overtly avoided the Yugoslav films studied here, although a similar 
religious suffocation can be perceived in the representation of the country’s leader, Tito, who 
is seen to be both human and god-like. The “people’s heroes” fight and die for Tito, who had 
issued explicit orders “not to be seen” in films.27 Tito’s absence, however, often marks him as 
even more prominent, as happens in Battle of Neretva. At a crucial point in the film, partisans 
circulate a piece of paper, which is handled from one person to the next while the camera 
focuses alternatively on the person or their hand. The object of our curiosity is eventually 
revealed in a close up of a message with a single sentence and a signature: “Prozor must fall 
tonight. Tito” (Figure 9). This unquestionable command is to be treated as gospel, showing 
Tito as “God’s surrogate’ to borrow Todor Kuljic’s expression.28 It is the view preserved in 
Tito’s Mausoleum in Belgrade, which recalls the mummification of Lenin, and shows how 
Tito filled the vacuum left by the official secularisation of the country and communism as a 
form of “political religion” in Emilio Gentile’s formulation.29  
By and large, films like Battle of Neretva were designed to sanction the togetherness of the 
entity that emerged at the end of the First World War as the Kingdom of Croats, Slovenes and 
Serbs. It was renamed as Yugoslavia (meaning, South Slavs) in 1929 by King Alexander, and 




groups was grounded on their memory of a united fight against an enemy that operated from 
outside and within the country, as well as the collective effort involved in its postwar 
reconstruction. Marko Attila Hoare outlines this perspective as follows: 
The Titoist regime in Yugoslavia encouraged the belief that all Yugoslavs participated 
in an equal manner and to an equal degree in the Partisan movement and that they did 
so on a homogenous, all Yugoslav, basis … The Partisan movement was a genuinely 
multinational movement but the roles played in it by the various Yugoslav nationalities 
were not equivalent … Serbs in Croatia might fight as Partisans to halt the persecution 
by the Ustashas; Croats in Dalmatia to resist the Italian annexation of their homeland; 
Muslims out of fear of the Chetniks; townsmen out of leftist sympathies; and peasants 
according to traditional patterns of rebelliousness.30  
This notion was harnessed by the cinematic genre closely associated with the leader 
overseeing that country’s unity, Tito. A film buff, Tito watched a single film most evenings 
throughout his life, and he effectively promoted and financed the lavish film industry that 
flourished during the “golden era” of Yugoslav films, from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s. 
Within this industry, Partizanski Films stood out both in terms of quantity and prominence, 
with Tito personally endorsing or correcting them, as documented by Turajlic. 
Tito not only watched endless reels of film but also sponsored the creation of the country’s 
main production company, the aforementioned Avala Film. This cinematic city, now derelict, 
thrived during the 1960s and 1970s, when it became the site of many co-productions and 
hosted a good number of international stars. In newsworthy terms, the studio’s coup the force 
was the arrival in in 1971 of Elizabeth Taylor and Richard Burton. The famous couple made 
numerous public appearances, recorded by the international press in photos with Tito and his 
wife, Jovanka Budisavljević Broz, who had been a Lieutenant General in the JNA during the 
war. Tito, who admired Burton, wanted the Welsh actor to impersonate him in Delić’s Battle 
of Sutjetska, also known as The Fifth Offensive, which represents a Nazi attack code named 
Case Black. 
Case Black took place in Nazi-occupied Bosnia-Hercegovina from 15 May to 16 June 1943 
and was the greatest engagement of the war in the Balkan nation. Using guerrilla hit-and-run 
tactics, the Partisans had managed to take the Durmitor area of northern Montenegro when 
the Nazis, seeking to uproot the movement, deployed nearly 130,000 troops to encircle 




that included 67,000 Germans, 43,000 Italians, 2,000 Bulgarians, 11,000 Croatians 
(Nezavisna Država Hrvatska) and 4,000 Četniks. In spite of being outnumbered 
approximately six to one, Tito’s partisans managed to break through enemy lines, which cost 
them more than 7,000 casualties with Tito wounded in the battle.32 Although suffering heavy 
losses, the partisans halted the offensive and the outcome of the encirclement boosted their 
credentials, with the Battle of Sutjeska becoming an integral part of the resistance mythology 
after the war. 
As in Battle of Neretva, the protagonists of Battle of Sutjetska are ordinary Yugoslavs, with a 
mixture of peasants, workers and intellectuals from different ethnicities. Emphasis is also 
placed on the different abilities of people, with disabled and older citizens also contributing 
to the struggle. The film even figures a “comrade poet” who takes his books with him and 
reads or exhorts his comrades during the battle. These men and women are seen fighting side-
by-side against the foreign occupiers and the “domestic traitors,” the Croatian Ustaša and the 
Serbian Četniks. Among these enemies, the Četniks occupy the unenviable position of being 
represented as unruly hordes, riding horses sabre in hand or cutting the throats of wounded 
partisans. By contrast, the Italian occupiers are handled with a certain degree of respect, seen 
by the casting of Captain Riva (Franco Nero), who changes sides to fight with the partisans 
because he wishes to see the end of fascism in Italy. Batančev suggests that Riva’s belated 
heroism could be partly due to the fact that “Italian co-producers … helped the distribution of 
the film on the international market.”33 Nevertheless, Riva’s position reflects the fact that, 
following the Armistice of Cassibile on 3 September 1943, many Italian soldiers deserted and 
some joined Tito’s Partisans, who were by then supported by the Allies and on course to win 
the war. Partisans also gained a lot of equipment abandoned by the Italians, which helped 
them substantially in the last stages of the war. 
In Battle of Sutjeska and Battle of Neretva, partisans are protagonists both as individuals and 
as part of a collective. The films engage with different personalities from different ethnic 
groups that interact and fight together, paradigmatic of Yugoslav “narodni heroji” (people’s 
heroes). These ordinary heroes are able to show solidarity across ethnic, class, gender and 
professional divisions and are willing to sacrifice themselves on behalf of the nation. This is 
the role of the three siblings who photograph themselves at the beginning of Battle of 
Neretva, and whose deaths punctuate the action (Figure 9). After one brother, Vuko (Radko 
Polic), dies early in the film, we get to know and identify with the other two siblings, Novak 




are given added poignancy by a brief romance between Danica and Ivan (Lojze Rozman). 
Ivan had proposed to Danica half way through the film, and they had agreed to marry at the 
war’s end but Danica dies heroically with Novak, after she volunteers to join a patrol sent to 
contain the Četniks.  
Whereas collaborators are antagonists who are cast as aliens in Yugoslav films, the Soviet 
films looked at in this article present them as part of a community from which they alienate 
themselves. As seen above, Portnov and Rybak offer different examples of Belarusian 
collaboration with the occupying forces in World War II. In fact, the Germans were 
welcomed as liberators in important segments of the Soviet Borderlands, including Western 
Ukraine, the Baltic Republics and Western Belarus. People collaborated there either out of 
sheer necessity, because they rejected Russians or Soviet domination or for ideological 
reasons, as had happened elsewhere with fascist or pro-fascist parties elsewhere in Europe. 
Needless to say, the “grey” zones of this conflict, where people might become a 
“collaborator’ or a “resister’ in order to survive or to help their families, were largely 
obliterated in the official memorialization of the war. Curiously, this mystification has been 
largely reinstated as the main narrative of the heirs of the USSR, the Russian Federation and 
Belarus.34 
Collaboration could be the only means of survival in a destructive war that threatened its 
existence and the livelihood of a large proportion of its citizens. The outright savagery meted 
out on civilians caught behind the fast-advancing German lines remains staggering to 
rehearse. At a conservative estimate, twenty-seven million Soviet citizens died, with the 
figure reaching forty million in some studies.35 The large majority of the casualties were 
civilians, although military deaths surpassed ten million, a figure that excludes the more than 
three million POWs who died in captivity due to forced labour and exposure.36 Probably the 
place to suffer the most was Belarus, where one in four of its nine million inhabitants were 
killed, including two thirds of its Jewish population. Alongside with Poland and the Ukraine, 
with which Belarus shared shifting borders, Belarus is the place where the murderous and 
genocidal extremes of Nazi Germany culminated, claiming the dubious honour of being at the 
forefront of destruction. According to Tim Snyder, of 
the nine million people who were on the territory of Soviet Belarus in 1941, some 1.6 
were killed by the Germans in actions away from battle fields, including about 700,000 




majority of whom were unarmed civilians) … A rough estimate of two million total 
mortal losses … seems reasonable and conservative … By the end of the war, half the 
population of Belarus had either been killed or moved.37  
In addition to human destruction, over 600 villages were completely obliterated, a number 
that may easily be multiplied when factoring in partial destruction. Not surprisingly, many 
Belarusians were left with the choice of either collaborating or contributing substantially to 
the Soviet war effort, joining the partisans or otherwise supporting them. Needless to say, 
Belarusian Jews were not given any option. 
This destruction is nowhere better captured that in Klimov’s Come and See, which presents 
the war’s brutality from the point of view of Florya (Aleksey Kravchenko), a boy of around 
fourteen, who loses first his childhood, then his family and subsequently his sanity. The long 
scene that details the village’s obliteration culminates the film’s charting of Florya’s brutal 
transformation from innocent boy to premature adult. This scene, which is shot with hand-
held camera, is chaotic and unsettling, as we witness people being rounded up and burnt in a 
barn while soldiers run or drive around to the backdrop of noises, shouts and diegetic music 
from a gramophone placed on a moving motorbike. All of them are then set alight in a barn 
whose construction is seen through the mist to resemble a church (Figure 10). The sole 
survivors and witnesses are an old woman who is prostrated in bed, who is spared on account 
of her inability to procreate, Florya, and a young woman who stands with bloody legs astride 
after been dragged away by the hair and dumped on a truck to be gang raped. The colourless 
partisans arrive too late to save people, though they are clearly above Germans in 
humanitarian or humane terms. 
It is worth remembering that, as harrowing as these scenes are, they are not far from the real 
horrors visited on Belarusians. The callous murderousness of einsatzkommandos like the one 
appearing in the film clearly stand for units such as the infamous Dirlewanger Brigade. They 
embody the staggering brutality of the war’s Eastern Front, and Klimov based the film on his 
own memory of it.38 Indeed, the “wait and see’ option available for Western countries at the 
beginning of the war was simply not accessible for most Belarusians. It was certainly not a 
choice for Belarusian Jews, whose genocide was submerged within the general war of 
extermination in Soviet memory.  
In spite of these horrors, Klimov, does not mystify Soviet partisans. This is clear from the 




Florya’s mother, disregarding her poverty and take away the house’s only boy, Florya. 
Partisans are seen to be clothed in neutral colours, shot in long shots or mid-close ups and 
never cast as figures with whom to empathise (Figure 11). Their leader, Kosach (Liubomiras 
Laucevičius) is largely silent, and his main actions include abandoning Florya and his 
“partisan wife,” Glasha (Olga Mironova), an act that can be seen as partly contemptuous and 
partly a desire to spare their lives. Kosach’s second, and perhaps more relevant, action is 
when he silently nods an order to spray Nazis and local politsai with gunshots. This summary 
execution is shown to be only kinder on account of the expressed wish of many in the crowd 
to torture and burn their prisoners alive in retaliation for the destruction the village, meant to 
stand for Khatyn, and the murder of all its inhabitants.  
Klimov’s film is considered one the most important production of the glasnost era, and 
exemplifies the cultural transition from the Stagnation, a label given by Gorvachov to the 
period dominated by Leonidas Brezhnev, and Gorvachov’s own opening up of the country in 
the second half of the 1980s, normally referred to as glasnost and perestroika.39 Although it 
makes oblique reference to the plight of Soviet Jews, the film adheres to the Soviet line of 
integrating the murder of Jews with that of the rest of the population under the German 
Generalplan Ost, in which some Slavs would be spared to serve as slaves to the master race. 
Klimov, however, stresses the absence of options for a population whose sole choices could 
be to join the Nazis as their subordinate policemen, join the resistance or to be killed 
otherwise in this war of annihilation.  
Post-Thaw’s films like Klimov’s thus shunned the propagandistic tone of the immediate 
postwar era, testing the permissiveness of the regime with visions that are far from 
celebratory in tone. As Youngblood suggests, the skilful use of images meant that filmmakers 
could circumvent existing censorship, thereby becoming “the historians of their generation’: 
“Working with images rather than words, these directors were able to subvert censorship, 
thereby functioning as the historians of their generation.”40 By contrast, the Yugoslav 
productions studied here negotiate the individualism and unshakable sense of collective duty 
of “people’s heroes.” These heroes are efficiently led by Comrade Tito, whose humanity and 
sense of duty are praised in no uncertain terms. Only unusual in this sense is Hajrudin 
Krvavac’s, Walter Defends Sarajevo. For a start, Krvavac’s film lacks the familiar tirades 
about the wonders of communist and the leadership of Marshal Tito that are present in most 
Partisan Films. Nevertheless, the fight remains unambiguously glorified in a film who was 




probably holds the record for number of Germans killed by a single partisan, Walter, after 
whose nom-de-guerre the production is named and who is played by the charismatic Serbian 
actor, Velimir “Bata” Živojinović. In this instance, and according to an interested viewer who 
has painstakingly investigated Walter’s body count, the protagonist manages to dispose of 
forty-two Nazis singlehandedly.41 
Walter Defends Sarajevo follows the conventions of the genre, including the use of historical 
footage of blitzkrieg war and blanket bombing, as well as the prescribed meetings of 
Germans discussing partisan resistance on a Yugoslav map. This time, they chat about 
“Operation Laufer,” to take place in Bosnia’s capital, Sarajevo. Unlike most films about 
Yugoslav resistance, Krvavac’s film is largely set in a city and not in the country’s mountains 
where the partisan guerrilla war was largely fought. Sarajevo’s landmarks figure 
conspicuously in the film providing not only a setting but also adding to the action and the 
interpretation of the struggle. The city’s skyline is shown when Walter shoots a good number 
of Germans from a church tower, and the old quarter and mosque also feature prominently 
when Germans chase the partisans. Like the countryside in partisan films, Sarajevo, is, by and 
large, united in its rejection of the occupiers. In fact, the city’s labyrinthine roads play their 
part in the struggle. This can be seen when the protagonists hide in the souk, while local 
artisans hammer loudly the handcrafted brass works typical of the city to distract the 
persecutors.  
Within Sarajevo, the underground cells of which Walter is part often operate at night, filmed 
with cinematography and camera work characteristic of thrillers or spy films. The characters, 
at times indistinguishable, appear and disappear from corners, casting long shadows and 
creating a degree of suspense reminiscent of the aforementioned genres during Hollywood’s 
Classic era. In Walter, however, this sombre tone is literally lightened up by the intermittent 
shooting and fighting sprees. The film’s climatic scene, reminiscent of Western films, is 
played on top of a moving train. Here, Walter and his two sidekicks, one of whom, Zus, 
played by another actor famous for his partisan roles, Ljubisa Samardzic, duly cheat their 
Nazi prosecutors and blow them up with their much-needed petrol. The three of them first 
dressed as Nazi soldiers and then as railway engineers first infiltrate the German camp and 
subsequently replace the machinists. When the plot is discovered, a fair number Germans on 
the train try to reach the engine only to be shot on the roofs of the coaches and roll down the 
mountain. Walter then unleashes all the coaches where the Germans and the petrol travel. We 




jumped out prior to the crash. Their return to occupied Sarajevo closes an action-packed film 
that, although devoid of the pro-Tito manifesto, offers a highly positive evaluation of 
Yugoslavia’s “imagined community.” This myth of ethnic harmonization helped sustain a 
regime that was built on entrenched antagonisms, which came to the fore after Tito’s death. 
As Hoare proposes, the legacy of the Partisan struggle contains the foundation on which 
mutual understanding can be built: “The Partisan movement forms part of the national 
heritage of both Serbs and Croats, as well as of Muslims and other former Yugoslav peoples. 
It represents at the same time a shared tradition of multinational cooperation that may one 
day help to reestablish friendly relations between the former Yugoslav states.”42 In this sense, 
films offer not only entertainment, but also a form of social consensus that can help foster a 
sense of community in a deeply divided land. 
Watched by millions of people in theatres and thereafter on television, VHS, DVD or Netfilx, 
partisan films stand out through their lasting impact on collective memory. They highlight the 
role played by cinematic memories of the war in the foundational narratives upon which these 
countries constituted or “imagined’ themselves. The films that deal with the Yugoslav 
partisan struggle showcase ethnic harmony at a time in which that harmony started to be 
challenged. The 1960s witnessed a halt to the economic prosperity of the previous two 
decades, which had been facilitated by the Marshall Plan, remittances from migrants and 
tourism, as Yugoslavia was the only communist country open to both. In this climate, 1963 
saw the Yugoslav Third Constitution, which fostered political decentralization, thereby 
enhancing devolution and the role of the different republics. This constitution, moreover, 
“enshrined the right of republics to leave the Yugoslav federation.”43 At this time, Tito 
endorsed the concept of “organic Yugoslavism,” which allowed the expression of nationalism 
within the federation. This contrasted with the “integral Yugoslavism” endorsed by the likes 
of Serbian leader Aleksandar Ranković, who subsequently fell from grace and was expelled 
from the party. The films studied here adhere to the vision of “organic Yugoslavism,” where 
solidarity provides the social cement for a country that is never mentioned as a unity. This 
implicit acknowledgment corroborates the fraught environment in which they were released, 
revealing the tenuous links that would begin to unravel from the 1980s. 
As with Yugoslav films, Soviet productions shaped and adhered to the social frameworks of 
collective memory, as delineated by Maurice Halbwachs.44 If Soviet monuments, such as 
Volvograd’s statue of the “Motherland,” offer a mixture of grandiose classicism and social 




patriotism and pro-Soviet militancy. In spite of censorship, these war films encapsulate the 
contradictions of the socio-political environment of the time in which they were produced, 
offering no paeans to the Party’s policies or to its leaders, past or present. Instead, they 
portray morally ambiguous, deeply moving human stories that eschew the virile posturing of 
the paradigmatic “people’s hero” as a version of his leader, Stalin. Under directors like 
Klimov, Shepitko and Tarkovsky, these films also subvert the techniques borrowed from 
socialist realism, effectively linking the spiritual, metaphysical and emotional destruction of 
the Great Patriotic War in the Soviet Union. 
The films studied in this article offer paradigmatic examples of the power of cinema not only 
to (mis)represent or contest the representation historical events, but to contribute effectively 
to their “invention,” in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger’s use of the term.45 These films 
validate the historical capital on which communal consensus was built in the war’s aftermath. 
The shared past of these societies, and the films that embody that past, display contingent 
points of union during or after a war where social or ethnic divisions were willfully erased. 
These cinematic representations are, at the same time, historical documents and, to borrow 
Nora’s famous formulation, “sites of memory,” which offer an outlet for emotions and for 
mourning. They showcase (or imagine) people’s “finest hours,” dignifying the trail of death 
that the Nazi invasion left behind. They also showcase and subvert the “messianic” or 
redemptive perspective of history outlined by Benjamin’s victor’s paradigm, creating history 
through constellations that challenge historicism’s teleological assumptions. The 
memorialization of the war in these films effectively link the physical, spiritual, metaphysical 
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